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Abstract: Taking Kevin Carter’s famous photograph of a Sudanese ‘Struggling
Girl’ as an example, this article shows by criticizing the work of photography scholar
Ariella Azoulay who argues for an ethic, reparative spectatorship that focuses on
the social encounters behind the photograph, how discussions about atrocity pho-
tography often result in moral debates: discussions that center around the social
relations behind photography and blame the photographer, but do not take into
account and criticize the photographic representation of the atrocity. By giving
an overview of the afterlife of Carter’s photograph, the articles shows how such a
‘social’ focus on photography, easily reaffirms the social inequalities that lies within
the practices of atrocity photography.
SINCERE PHOTOGRAPHS OVERWHELMED BY THEIR
CONTEXT
At the moment Kevin Carter’s photograph of a very young, starving Sudanese
child, being closely watched by an approaching vulture, was published in the
New York Times on March 26, 1993, spectators did not react in the way
they are supposed to react (See fig. 1). Atrocity pictures are ordinarily used
to let spectators feel emotionally connected to the photographed subject,
yet this specific photograph did not succeed in arousing its desired effects.1
Namely, the spectators of Carter’s photograph reacted with more than just
the intended feelings of compassion and guilt for the pictured victim. They
focused their attention on something that was not literally visible in the
photograph: the photographer. The most frequently asked and somewhat
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Figure 1: Photo: Kevin Carter
naïve question of the New York Times readers was: ‘Did the photographer
stop and help this suffering child?’2 When it became clear that Carter had
done nothing to help the little girl, he was broadly criticized in popular media.
Although I do not readily agree with the condemnation of Carter’s action—
an easy moral judgment that, as I will make clear in this article, simplifies the
practice of atrocity photography—I nevertheless believe that this widespread
reaction must be seriously considered.3 Leaving my views on Carter’s inac-
tion aside for now, I rather question whether this negative response to the
photograph in the popular media was in any way an appropriate reaction.
We can at least notice that the spectators’ way of looking at this atrocity
photograph was peculiar. Despite the fact that almost nothing in the photo-
graph ‘betrays’ the presence of the photographer—neither the child nor the
vulture look into the camera after all—spectators went so far as to reinsert
the photograph back into its original context to reconstruct the encounter
between the photographer and the photographed subject.4
In light of their condemnation of Carter, who in their eyes made not one,
but two immoral choices since he made no effort to help the child and let her
suffer in order to capture an emotive shot, the spectators of Carter’s photo-
graph acted as ideal spectators. If we follow the arguments of the famous
photography scholar Ariella Azoulay, whose ideas are widely acknowledged
in recent photography criticism/philosophy, such concerned spectators are
‘citizens of photography’. According to Azoulay our ‘ethic responsibility’ as
spectators towards photographs is to rehabilitate the gap between the ‘still’
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photograph and the active practice of photography, between the printed im-
age and the photographic event: that is, the event that occurred between
the photographer and the photographed subject.5 When spectators recognize
the photograph as a trace of an actual event and look beyond the frame of
the photograph, they begin to realize that the meaning of photographs is not
restricted to the photographer or to those who participate in their production
and publication.6 As long as the photograph is viewed (in the right way), the
event of photography continues and the photograph can acquire new mean-
ings. And this is exactly what happened when newspaper readers responded
to Carter’s photograph the way they did. They gave the photograph a docu-
mentary (albeit temporary) significance, an alternative way of looking at it.
To them the photograph no longer depicted the miserable fate of a young child
in need of help, but testified against Kevin Carter’s decision to shoot, rather
than aid the victim. Since, as Azoulay remarks, no single participant of the
event of photography—that is, photographer, photographed, and spectator—
can claim full authority over a photograph’s final meaning, the practice of
photography appears to be ‘a new tribunal, a universal and impartial judge
that could do justice to the past, present and future’.7
While I appreciate Azoulay’s ‘citizens of photography’, her emancipatory
approach raises additional concerns. Can spectators actually do justice to
the unequal power-relations existing between the photographer and the pho-
tographed child; or between them, as privileged spectators, and the child;
by focusing on the event of photography, that is, on the social relationships
behind the photograph? Does the spectators’ realization that the meaning
of the photograph cannot be appropriated by a single person, automatically
make all participants of photography ‘formally equal individuals’?8 Can we
speak of a ‘reparative spectatorship’ if we look at the controversy that Carter’s
photograph initiated and its consequences?
Faced with an exemplary situation, availed by the global circulation of
Carter’s photograph, we see what happens when spectators focus on the event
of photography. I thus question Azoulay’s assumption that spectators can
simply and in all cases do justice to the atrocity that took place before the
camera by acting as ‘citizens of photography’. Although photographs within
the practice of atrocity photography, such as this one by Carter, are mostly
made with good intentions—photographers mean them to arouse concern for
the situation depicted, provoke indignation, and move viewers to action—
the public’s particular response to Carter’s photograph demonstrates how
Azoulay’s proposed way of looking at photographs rarely repairs the inequal-
ities between the participants of the event of photography.9 Contrarily, as
shown below by my retracing the impact made by reprinting Carter’s pho-
tograph and their corresponding debates in the popular media, the unequal
differences between the photographed girl on the one hand, and the photo-
grapher Carter (and with him the privileged, mostly Western, spectators) on
the other, actually increased at the very moment the photograph started to
3
The Atrocity of Representing Atrocity.
provoke moral outrage.10 One could say that the distraction caused by the
readers’ concerns overpowered the photograph’s point, turning attention to
the spectators instead. Discussions about Carter’s despondence as a photo-
grapher overwhelmed the terrible Sudanese situation, for which Carter’s sym-
bolic photograph was his attempt to prompt Western compassion/action.We
thus cannot speak of a ‘reparative spectatorship’ brought on by the specta-
tors’ focus on the social relations behind the photograph, as Azoulay claims.
More important, since the focus of the ‘ideal spectatorship’ that Azoulay
argues for lies primarily (or even exclusively) with the participants of pho-
tography (the photographed subject, the photographer, and the spectator),
the photograph as a representation of the atrocity is easily left out of view.
Therefore, in contrast to the often-held ‘moralized’ discussions about Carter’s
job as a photographer, I turn to atrocity photograph itself and its shortcom-
ings in depicting atrocities. Starting with the original publication of Carter’s
photograph as a problematic representation of an atrocity, we will soon see
how such photographs and the machinery behind them, can be seen as not
only participating in the very atrocity they aim to capture, but exploiting the
situation to gain attention for whatever publication prints them. This is a
crucial element of the practice of atrocity photography that should be recog-
nized. Any spectator who does not recognize the often-problematic represen-
tation of atrocity in atrocity photography risks becoming guilty of reenacting
the atrocity. Although some inevitable shortcomings of atrocity photography
cannot be overcome by any kind of spectatorship, a more inclusive specta-
torship that includes how the photograph functions and acknowledges the
underlying power structures implicit in atrocity photography, would at least
diminish the risk that spectators will affirm and perpetuate these unequal
power structures.
SERIOUS PHOTOGRAPHS DIVORCED FROM THEIR
CONTENT
Carter’s terrifying photograph was first published to illustrate a New York
Times article about the deadly famine in Sudan were people were dying at
the rate of fifteen people per hour.11 Printed on the newspaper’s front cover,
adjacent an article entitled ‘Sudan is Described as Trying to Placate the
West,’ the article addressed how the famine in Southern Sudan was the out-
come of the long-term civil war between the Muslim-Arab North and the
predominantly black and Christian South.12 As a result of this ongoing con-
flict, all supply lines to the South had been blocked and this famine-stricken
region had been long inaccessible to Western relief organizations. This sit-
uation was beginning to change, however, as the article explained that the
Sudanese government was opening up parts of the disaster region to West-
ern help. Contrary to the article’s optimism, the caption accompanying the
photograph read: ‘[B]ut for some it could be too late. A little girl weakened
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from hunger, collapsed recently along the trail to a feeding center in Ayod.
Nearby, a vulture waited’.13
Considering the complicated political situation this article describes, it’s
odd that the editor would select such an immediate photograph. The photo-
graph not only shows a vulnerable naked girl and an animal, whose distance
to its human prey is difficult to guess because of the perspective from which
the photograph is taken, but it says absolutely nothing about the political
situation in Sudan. Readers cannot infer the enormous magnitude of the
famine, let alone that a civil war had caused her miserable situation or that
the Sudanese government had rebuffed efforts by Western relief organizations.
The ‘poverty’ of the image and its depoliticized character hardly corresponds
to the political problems discussed in the article. It is therefore not surprising
that the New York Times readers were less upset by the problems in Sudan
than with a photograph that scarcely related to the situation at hand. So
many people contacted the newspaper to ask what had happened to the child
that four days later the editor posted this note: ‘The photographer reports
that she recovered enough to resume her trek after the vulture was chased
away. It is not known whether she reached the center’.14
Only a few news organizations, such as Time and the South African Globe
and Mail, reprinted the photograph. However, when the photograph quite un-
expectedly won the Pulitzer Prize in 1994, the photograph appeared widely
across news media. Although the photograph was widely praised because
for its photographic qualities, criticism quickly overwhelmed positive reac-
tions. Each time the photograph was reprinted, it evoked the same discom-
fort as with its first publication. The initial questions about the girl’s fate
started to be accompanied by widespread discussions about the practice of
photojournalism.15 Time after time, these discussions questioned Carter’s be-
haviour, especially after more details about his encounter with the girl and
the vulture became known. Carter admitted that he had acted carefully not
to disturb the bird, how he had positioned himself to capture the best possible
image, and waited twenty minutes for the vulture to spread its wings. When
the vulture failed to do as he had hoped, he chased the vulture away and
witnessed the little girl as she resumed her struggle.16 Carter’s photograph,
now equally his own story, continued to outrage spectators worldwide. In the
St. Petersburg Time, for example, a journalist remarked how the photogra-
pher claiming to take his time, so as to shoot the girl’s suffering, is no less a
predator than the real vulture depicted in the scene.17
After Kevin Carter committed suicide in 1994, the photograph’s meaning
changed again. Some people even connected his death to this photograph, a
photograph that was suddenly considered ‘fatal’. The photograph was pub-
lished once again in the New York Times, this time accompanying his obit-
uary, indirectly suggesting that the photograph’s negative fame led Carter
to kill himself, since he ‘always carried around the horror of the work he
did’.18 In light of these sentences, the New York Times perpetuated a narra-
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tive of resentment, soon adopted by the rest of the media, suggesting that a
photo-journalist had, as it were, paid the price for a mistake that he made
while reporting a story. Within this narrative, Carter was reimagined as an
incomprehensible hero who had risked his whole life to bring atrocities to the
attention of his primarily Western audience, absent the praise he so deserved.
This hero-narrative is never so obvious as in the documentary The Death of
Kevin Carter (2004), which describes Carter as: ‘this wonderful, tough, sexy
photographer, [. . . ] impatient with the people who did not understand what
he was doing’.19 Whereas Carter had been seen on par with the vulture, this
documentary places him on par with the photographed girl, since both suf-
fered in their encounter. Consider the documentary’s description of his death:
‘The pain, the suffering was over’.20
As we can conclude from this short overview of the afterlife of Carter’s
photograph, the initial attention for the girl’s fate was gradually replaced
by a focus on the photographer, first characterized as immoral, and then
as an incomprehended hero. As a result of the photograph’s fame, Kevin
Carter himself became famous. His name is known worldwide; the girl, on
the other hand, is still anonymous, and her fate unknown. In retracing the
different phases of Carter’s photograph from an illustration of the Sudanese
famine to evidence of the photographer’s immoral decision, and a story of
resentment, we realize how the photograph offers a window onto various so-
cial encounters—a view, that according to Azoulay has the potential to do
justice to the ‘captured atrocity’. However, when we recognize how many
social relationships are invested in this image, the inequalities between the
photographer and the photographed girl are intensified, rather than reduced.
The spectators of Carter’s photograph saw in his image the photogra-
pher’s failure to witness, since he himself didn’t respond to the atrocity oc-
curring before his camera. Jay Prosser remarks how ‘the viewer[s] of such
a photograph [would] not want to replicate the failure of witnessing,’ but in
the end, this is exactly what the viewers of Carter’s photograph did, how-
ever unintentionally.21 Given their singular focus on the photographer’s be-
haviour, they replicate his failure to witness. Although viewers’ judgments
of Carter are understandable, had they seized a broader perspective on the
photograph’s condition that not only included the social relations behind the
photograph, but the image itself, they might have realized how their repeat
rants reiterated the atrocity before them.
What the spectators failed to see, and what is missing throughout the
primarily moral debate surrounding Carter’s photograph is the fact that the
photograph is not only a representation of an atrocity, but it is also part of an
atrocity itself. A risk in Azoulay’s approach of focusing primarily on the social
encounters before and after the moment of taking an actual photograph is
the problem of photography itself, the way the act of representing an atrocity
remains out of view. Therefore in this paper’s third section, I focus on the
photograph itself within the context of atrocity photography, or even more
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specifically famine photography, and the photograph as a problematic source
for representing atrocities.
SENSATIONAL PHOTOGRAPHS DOOMED BY THEIR
PURPOSE
If we place Carter’s world-famous photograph back into its lesser known,
original context, we notice how the atrocity is reiterated here in the medium,
its representation. What does Carter use to ‘illustrate’ the deadline famine in
Sudan? It shows one very young, lonely child whose body is so starved that
she can barely carry her head. Her skin’s darkness and swollen belly identify
the child as African, while her necklace and bracelet signify femininity.22
Apart from these adornment, the struggling girl is naked. Except for the
vulture, no one else seems present in this barren, dried out landscape.
As already noted, the picture ignores the political context of the Sudanese
famine, thereby depoliticizing the complex circumstances that have caused
this girl’s miserable fate. Based solely on that what we observe in the pho-
tograph, the spectators lack clues required to understand the cause of the
famine, the vulnerable girl’s status, or where in Africa this event is occurring.
The only visible threat is the vulture, as if this atrocity has a natural, rather
than a political cause. The photograph thus fails to explain the inherently
political nature of the Sudanese famine.23 Although people often argue that
atrocity photography at least brings oft-overlooked tragedies to the public’s
attention, the public’s initial reaction to this photograph should lead one to
question this assumption. In this case, the representation, or rather misrep-
resentation, distracts attention from the very problem the photograph meant
to highlight. Failing to represent the 1993 Sudanese famine, it is seen as an
image of ‘famine’, ‘mass starvation in Africa’, and is considered among some
as a ‘universal icon of human suffering.’24
If we think about the broader ideas Carter’s image of struggling girl con-
veys, what is left of her individuality? Her naked, vulnerable, female black
body is clipped from its political context, no longer belongs to the girl herself.
Hariman and Lucaites describe such images as ‘individuated aggregate,’ since
the struggling girl represents a collective experience, even though she is just
one person. In the metonymical structure of the individuated aggregate, a
broad problem (famine) is reduced to a specific embodiment (child).25 Even
though the difference in economic, political, and socio-cultural status between
the photographer and the anonymous girl were enormous to start with, his
taking her picture both reaffirms and reinforces his privileged position in
comparison to her subordinated position. In this photographic moment, the
photographer ‘takes’ human subjects and ‘uses’ them to instrumentalize sub-
jective matter, thereby enacting the ‘eye of power.’26
Were we to focus on the social relations ‘behind’ the photograph, as
Azoulay recommends, we would discover yet another outcome of the photo-
graphic moment, whereby the photographer has made the girl into a represen-
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Figure 2: ‘Why Famine Persists’ Cover New York Times Magazine. 13 July 2003.
tative object, enabling prosperous spectators to treat her like an empty vessel
for their pity.27 Meanwhile, the photographer has become a privileged observer
who has the power to turn human subjects into pitiful photographic objects,
an action so powerful that spectators do this whenever they regard such pho-
tographs. Azoulay’s proposed way of alternatively viewing photographs thus
cannot restore socio-political inequalities between the victim and the pho-
tographer, or between the victim and the spectators. The photograph has
produced unequal social relations, relations that are unconsciously reinforced
each time the photograph is being viewed without paying attention to these
inequalities. From this perspective, we can see why it is necessary, as Prosser
rightly points out, to ‘widen the concept of atrocity’ from the atrocities de-
picted by photography to the ‘process of [atrocity] photography itself’.28
If part of the problematic character of this photograph can be found within
the whole practice of atrocity photography, it is important not to solely zoom
in on Carter’s specific photograph. It must be placed inside a larger frame
instead. His photograph must thus not be seen as an isolated case, but as part
of a larger tradition of instrumentalizing poor, African regions. Carter’s pho-
tograph would not be so effective in evoking feelings of pity for the struggling
girl had it not employed prior stereotypes of vulnerability. Strong symbols
such as the ‘female’, ‘the child’, and ‘the black, naked body’ are all visible in
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the photograph and all contribute to transform a young African into a repre-
sentative image for African despair. The long-standing use of mostly Western
stereotypes of ‘poor’ Africa serves to justify and bolster the inequalities be-
tween the world of the spectator and the photographed. As David Campbell
clarifies: ‘[B]ecause these tropes have a long colonial history, stereotypical
photographs embody colonial relations of power that contrast an adult and
superior global North with an infantilized and inferior global South’.29
In their depictions of famine, photographers perfectly adopt the con-
ventions of portraying African food crises.30 As the 2003 cover of the New
York Times Magazine aptly illustrates, the depiction of famine has remained
largely static across time and space (fig. 2). The cover shows a montage of
36 black-and-white famine photographs, taken in different African countries
between 1968 and 2003, all depicting close-ups of lone children or women with
particular emphasis on their famished black bodies, photographed in deserted,
depoliticized contexts. The use of this montage to illustrate the article ‘Why
Famine Persists’ suggests a causal connection between repeat famines and
images of poverty that reproduce cultural and racial stereotypes that both
perpetuate and justify Africa’s dependence on humanitarian help from thriv-
ing countries, a subordinate position that Carter’s photograph consciously
exploits.
THE UNFEASABILITY OF ATROCITY PHOTOGRAPHY
If Carter’s photograph can be placed within a larger, long-standing photo-
graphic discourse that produces African, inferior victims, how justified are his
critics who blame his inaction, his attention-getting schemes or his exploita-
tive imagery? Can we blame him for doing what Western media asked him to
do, that is, to grant a distant famine a human face? We can criticize Carter
for the way in which he depicted the Sudanese famine, but given this topic
(the famine) and his tool (a camera), what else could he have done? How
does one use a single image to convey a widespread famine, that has already
had so many victims, with a complicated, political history? Faced with the
difficulties of representing atrocities like famine, we are confronted with the
limits of photography, a machinery that cannot do anything, but represent; a
practice that cannot go beyond representation. Therefore, no matter how one
photographs the Sudanese famine, the single image will always, in some way
or another, take something away from the intensity, scope, and complexity
of the very atrocities that cause their photographed victims to suffer. In a
situation where an atrocity is of such a character that it can never be ade-
quately represented, our desire to represent and our call for representation
activates the very atrocity we pretend to vilify, ensuring inaction and thus
continuing the atrocity. In the case of Carter’s photograph we can agree with
Jean-François Lyotard’s argument that: ‘the “perfect crime” does not consist
in killing the victim or the witnesses [. . . ] but rather in obtaining the silence
9
The Atrocity of Representing Atrocity.
of the witnesses, the deafness of the judges, and the inconsistency (insanity)
of the testimony.’31 In other words, it is the attempt to gain control over the
Sudanese famine, to master the atrocity by fitting it into existing frameworks
of representation that escalates victims of atrocity, such as the girl in Carter’s
photograph, and thus constitutes a huge deficiency in the practice of atrocity
photography.
If representation itself is an important part of the problem of atrocity pho-
tography, then Azoulay’s approached way of looking at photographs, focused
as it is on the social encounters surrounding the photograph, which the repre-
sentation leaves out of view, is limited to a high degree. As we have seen with
Carter’s photograph, a focus on the encounter that took place before the cam-
era changed what we saw in the photograph, but brought greater attention
to a lesser ‘atrocity’: that is, Carter’s decision to take the photograph, rather
than the stereotypes he deployed to misrepresent the famine’s political aims.
With their focus on the encounter between Carter and the girl, which led to
their condemnation of Carter, spectators hardly acted as judges who could
repair the injustices done to her, let alone restore her rights, as Azoulay claims
‘citizens of photography’ do. On the contrary, because the problem with this
photography lies primarily in its representation, every time spectators look
at it without questioning its representational schemes, they are equally re-
sponsible for perpetuating the atrocity. That does not mean that we should
not contribute any power to the spectators, to the citizens of photography.
Azoulay is right in arguing that as long as photographs are viewed, they can
acquire new meanings. However, so long as an atrocity photograph only calls
attention to the ‘event of photography’, the atrocity photograph overwhelms
both the atrocity and the broader practice of atrocity photography of which it
forms a small part. Atrocity photographs’ supposedly ‘reparative spectator-
ship’ reconfirms the unequal power structures that the photograph depicts,
rather than abolishes them. Carter’s photograph remains a strong image,
but it is also a horrible, appealing photograph that either requests and re-
ceives attention or stirs a debate about unbearable situations in Africa. But
before a critical focus on the photographic representation itself is included
in the spectatorship of Carter’s photograph, maybe the best way to do any
justice to Carter’s ‘struggling girl’—to the photographed atrocity and to the
atrocity of photography—is contradictorily to not show or look at Carter’s
photograph at all.
merlijngeurts@hotmail.com
NOTES
1. Prosser 2012, 10.
2. Stamets 1994.
3. I want to make clear beforehand that I do
not easily agree with the reaction of most
spectators who blamed Carter for taking
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the photograph instead of helping the girl,
a reaction that undermines the complexity
of the situation. It is too easy to moral-
ize Carter’s decision at that time to not
help the girl and see this as a failure of
Carter to act humanely. These specta-
tors do not take into account the fact that
Carter was in Sudan as a photographer
who tries to bring the food problem in
Sudan to the attention by visualizing the
problem in photographs, and not as an aid
worker. Nevertheless, since this ‘naïve’ re-
sponse has been so widespread, and espe-
cially because it fits the ‘ideal spectator-
ship’ that the scholar Ariella Azoulay ar-
gues for, and which this article criticizes,
I believe that the popular response has to
be taken seriously. For more nuanced and
complex academic responses to Carter’s
act of taking the photograph see for ex-
ample Kleinman and Kleinman 1997.
4. van Gerwen Ms, 177-178.
5. Azoulay 2005, 43 and Azoulay 2008, 121
6. Azoulay 2008, 121.
7. Azoulay 2008, 113. In her work, Azoulay
also includes the camera as a participant of
the event of photography. However, since
her theory is exclusively focused on the
social relations between the participants
of photography and does not attribute a
significant role to the camera (and the re-
sulting photographs) and to the practices
of which the camera forms a part, I did
not name the camera itself as a partici-
pant of the event of photography, in or-
der to reiterate the camera’s passive role
in Azoulay’s theories.
8. Azoulay 2008, 81.
9. Reinhardt 2007, 13.
10. Although this paper focuses on reprints of
Carter’s photograph in popular media, this
photograph has circulated in other con-
texts. Most importantly, scholarly discus-
sions often point to this photograph as
the perfect vehicle for discussing morality
and photography. Although I do not an-
alyze this more nuanced discussion here,
given this paper’s limited scope, I have
noticed that moral discussions concerning
Carter’s photograph focus primarily on the
behaviour of the photographer and the
spectators, though not the morality of rep-
resentation itself.
11. Lorch 1993.
12. Murphy 1993.
13. Lorch 1993.
14. Editor 1993.
15. Zelizer 2010, 168
16. MacLeod 1994, 71
17. Stamets 1994.
18. Keller 1994.
19. The Death of Kevin Carter: Casualty of
the Bang Bang Club. Dir. Dan Krauss,
2004.
20. Krauss, 2004.
21. Prosser 2012, 10.
22. Pollock 2012, 74.
23. Campbell 2012, 83.
24. Cohen 2001, 178.
25. Hariman and Lucaites 2007, 89.
26. Mitchell 1994, 288.
27. Of course the question what happens to
the individuality of the girl after the pho-
tograph is taken, is not the only ques-
tion we have to ask ourselves as viewers.
We cannot disapprove a photograph solely
based on the fact that the girl is not rep-
resented as herself, but in the construction
of the individuated aggregate stands for
something bigger: a construction that we
can find in almost every photograph and
that can oftentimes successfully bring a
unnoticed problem to the attention. How-
ever, because in this article I follow the
perspective on photographs of Azoulay,
where we focus on the social encounters
surrounding the photograph, including the
encounter between the photographer and
photographed girl, I think we also have to
take into account the girl as a real person,
and not only as photographed object that
represents something else.
28. Prosser 2012, 12.
29. Campbell 2012, 84.
30. From a historical perspective it is inter-
esting to note that the discussion Carter’s
photograph evoked bears striking similar-
ities with the controversy around one of
the oldest photographs of famine. William
Willoughby Hooper, a British army lieu-
tenant and amateur photographer took
several pictures of famished people while
stationed in Madras during a great famine
of 1876-1878. When it became known that
Hooper did not give any food, treatment or
help to his photographed victims, he was
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highly criticized in the British press for his
immoral behaviour. Therefore, not only
the photograph, but also the moral debate
around Carter’s photograph can thus be
placed in a historical tradition. See: Ste-
foff 2008, 13.
31. Lyotard 1998, 8.
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